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Friday, May 16, 2008 The Obstacles to the Djibouti 'Somali Peace Talks' A/Rasaq Hashi, E-mail: Alldalka@Alldalka.com The UN Special Envoy to Somalia, Ahmedou Ould Abdallah, made an earnest request to all members of the Somali Diaspora to support the Djibouti ‘technical meeting’ peace talks between the Ethiopian founded Transitional Federal Government and the Asmara based Somali opposition groups. In exchange, he promised them to be informed any process of these talks as it develops. Yet, this meeting may face the same deterrents that disoriented the previous Somalia’s warlord peace conferences: Luck of compromise and commitment, foreign interference, and the absence of useful and effectual menace—for the warlords—that could push the peace process forward. As we all recall, one of the main obstacles that rooted out the outcomes of the previous Somalia’s warlord peace conferences was the foreign interference. Every peace process was virtually spoiled; and every step forward was cruelly incapacitated by either a neighboring country, which is mythically frightened to see strong and united Somalia again, or by a wanderer foreign government discontented the framework or the conclusion of any of those peace processes. In this ‘technical meeting’ not only the fingerprints and the footmarks of both interferers can easily be seen, but also their intensive activities can be detected again. The TFG representatives are seated on the hard-liner’s side of the table to reject any concession about the constitution amendment, the Ethiopian presence in Somalia, and the power sharing deal between the two sides which are the key factors to the success of this meeting. In an interview with the VOA, the TFG leader, Abdullahi Yusuf rejected any future compromise by his government about any above-mentioned three elements and he called “all those opposed to his government terrorists who intend to use force to take over the country’s leadership.” This statement shows the extremely obstinate attitude of him regarding his rugged position towards the peace process. In addition, every meeting that he holds with the foreign leaders, he stresses only the need for military support rather than pressing credible political peace process. Those three fundamental points are the crosspiece of the conflict between the two sides, and they were advisedly neglected in the last four years. Nevertheless, almost every statement from the top TFG leaders regarding the peace process sounded like the same Ethiopian argument: Prevent any peace accord excluding its interest in the region; this strategy solely benefits the Ethiopian regime which compels the TFG to safeguard Ethiopia’s old age hidden agenda in the region. On the other side, the Asmara based opposition groups are not free from foreign designed policies to counteract the Ethiopian influence in the Horn of Africa. Eritrea can only lessen Ethiopia’s overfilled military build up on its boarders by opening another front from the east (Somalia). It is then the Alliance of the Re-liberation which has to fight a war with two objectives: Librating Somalia from the invading Ethiopian army and fulfilling the compelled Eritrean interest. Similarly, this policy solely benefits Eritrea which conditions Somali opposition groups to be seated in Asmara in return to their commitment of safeguarding its interest in the region. Thus even if a peace harmony is signed between the Transitional Federal Government and the Asmara based opposition groups, neither side is capable to carry out any agreement without answering the needs of their protectors; or unless there are penalties allocated by the International Community for a possible breach of any agreement from all stakeholders in the Somali conflict—the TFG, the opposition groups, and also their backers, Ethiopia and Eritrea. The other serious failure that endangers this preliminary peace process is the luck of compromise and commitment between the two groups. It is not that important to have a signed landmark peace agreement, but the solidity of the accord and its ability to proceed in the days and months to come has more significance. Thirteen previous Somalia’s warlord peace conferences were held over the course of the last seventeen years, and yet none of them were successfully ended the Somalia crisis. That is because the objectives of the Somali crisis stakeholders were not reciprocal. All of these conferences shared one thing: Creating further disagreement, bloodshed, and displacement; the consequence was always energizing the differences between the warlords and the outcomes created more bloodsheds and destruction. Thus, valuable give and take between the two sides that should be propped up by the International Community—if they are willing to do so—would speed up ending Somalia crisis. It is a must and necessary this time to have both compromise and commitment in this meeting for the interest of the millions of the Somali people and for the country. Another serious failure endangers the Djibouti peace negotiation is the absence of useful and effectual menace for war crimes tribunal against leaders of the two groups and their backers to push the peace process forward. This kind of threat can frighten them and may in fact lead to an acceleration of the peace process to find a final solution for the Somalia crisis. It is the only and the effective tool that had never been employed the entire Somalia peace process. This intimidation can be materialized to put pressure on both sides—the TFG and its ally, the Ethiopian regime, from one side, and the opposition groups and its protector, Eritrea, from the other side—to either accept the peace process and the compromise voluntarily or face dire consequence: The International war crimes tribunal. Conclusion Somali people have no choice but to accept Ambassador Ould Abdallah’s appeal to support the Djibouti ‘technical meeting’ peace process between the Ethiopian founded Transitional Federal Government and the Asmara based Somali opposition groups. They enthusiastically welcome any effort to bring peace and stability back to their country. However, they warn that this Djibouti meeting may face the same obstacles that disoriented the previous Somalia’s warlord peace conferences: Luck of compromise and commitment between the two sides (Transitional Federal Government and the Asmara based Somali Opposition Groups), foreign interference (mainly Ethiopia and Eritrea), and the absence of useful and effectual menace (International war crimes tribunal) that could push the peace process forward. Thus, the success of this meeting depends on what considerations have been given to the sources of these deterrents. Previous Article: UN Envoy clashes with the Somali Diaspora Network
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